We considered the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction, which they sell as the best of both worlds:

We considered the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction, which they sell as the best of both worlds: under full information, prot-target equilibria coincide with the bidder-optimal points in the core (like in Bernheim and Whinston); and when goods are substitutes, truthful bidding is an equilibrium even with private information, leading to an ecient outcome as in the Vickrey auction. However, we havent been able to say much on the theoretical side about private information combined with complementarities. (Finally, for variety, we wrapped up with some analysis of wars of attrition and a generalized all-pay setting.) So, where do we go from here?

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